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Abstract: This study seeks to explore, how market efficiency changes, if ordinary 
traders receive fundamental news more or less often. We show that longer temporal 
information gaps lead to fewer but larger shocks and a reduction of the average noise 
level on the dynamics. The consequences of these effects for market efficiency are 
ambiguous.  Longer temporal  information  gaps  can deteriorate or improve market 
efficiency. The concrete result depends on the stability of the market together with 
the interval in which the length of the gap is incremented.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Conceived in the 1960s the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has become one of the most 
famous  economic  paradigms.  It  states  that  security  prices  fully  reflect  all  available 
fundamental  information.  Fama  (1970)  has  differentiated  three  interpretations  of  such 
efficiency. The following formulation rests partly on Jensen (1978):  
In  general  a  market  is  efficient  with  respect  to  information  set 𝜃?  if 𝜃?  is  properly 
reflected in prices. 
–  In  the  weak  form 𝜃? comprises  solely  the  information  contained  in  the  past  price 
history of the market as of time t.  
–  In the semistrong form 𝜃? comprises all information publicly available at time t.  
–  In the strong form 𝜃? comprises all information known to anyone at time t. 
In the past thirty years lots of empirical (e.g. Shiller 1981, Cutler et al. 1989, Lev 1989, 
Mitchel and Mulherin 1994) as well as some analytical findings (Grossmann and Stieglitz 
1980,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  1997)  have  challenged  the  EMH.  The  flourishing  field  of  
behavioral finance (see, e.g. Shleifer 2000, Hirshleifer 2001, Shiller 2003, or Lo 2004) has 
proposed some explanations of its failing. The central insight is that agents do not process 
information fully rationally but follow sentiments and commit systematic errors. Still, this 
view simplifies the reality of financial markets. Due to publicity laws and corporate disclosure 
policies, for instance, traders do not even receive fundamental information currently.  Our 
analysis focuses on this fact and its consequences for market efficiency.  
The underlying question of our research is: How does market efficiency change, if ordinary 
traders  receive  fundamental  information  more  or  less  often?  In  this  context,  the  term 
“temporal information gap” will denote the span of time in which traders do not receive any  
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fundamental news. For the purpose of a deeper classification of the research problem let us 
conceptualize the process of value discovery as a complex process. The computation of the 
proper fundamental value necessities three conditions: 
I.  Fundamental  data  must  be  available.  In  reality  disclosure  regulations  obligate 
firms to disseminate fundamental data only at discrete steps of time. 
II.  Fundamental data must be complete, correct and definite. In reality disclosure 
regulations do not prescribe to publish all value-relevant information and give 
considerable leeway to creative accounting.  
III.  Agents must know the exact relationship between fundamental information and 
value. Not every real trader is an expert and uses rational methods to compute the 
true  value  out  of  the  bulk  of  data.  Additionally,  the  methods  themselves  are 
diverse and approximative.
1 
-------- Figure 1 -------- 
Figure 1 illustrates the process of value discovery. The process implicates the possibility of 
information gaps on the side of traders. The term “information gap” is originated in agency 
theory where it is used synonymously for the deficit of information of the agent relative to the 
principal. Regarding the process of value discovery two causes of such an information deficit 
become apparent. First, agents have not received the latest information and second, agents 
have received the latest information, but the information lack of content. Accordingly, we 
denominate the first form of information gap as “temporal” and the second as “substantive”. 
Temporal as well as substantive information gaps can arise in various extents. The extent of a 
temporal  information  gap  (TIG)  is  determined  by  the  time  that  agents  lack  of  current 
information. We specify the TIG as the number of periods in which agents do not get any 
                                                 
1 For an overview of common methods see Brealey et al. (2006).  
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news. At the end of a TIG, e.g. via corporate disclosure, agents receive all information. We 
assume that once the information is public, the true fundamental value is known to traders, 
that is, condition II and III are fulfilled.
2 
To conduct our analyses we construct an agent -based model of a financial security market. 
The chartist-fundamentalist approach has proven to be a powerful tool in this area (for recent 
surveys see Hommes 2006, LeBaron 2006, Lux 2006, Westerhoff 2008 and Westerhoff 2009. 
The behavioral approach is based on the observation that financial traders use two main 
strategies: fundamental and technical analysis. Fundamentalists fix thei r orders to economic 
fundamentals, whereas chartists try to predict prices  by simple technical trading rules based 
upon patterns in past prices, such as trends . The interplay of both strategies creates model 
dynamics that replicate some stylized facts of real financial markets.  
What might be a reasonable assumption about the relationship of TIGs and market efficiency? 
Consider that the forces of arbitrage tend to adjust prices to the value which arbitrageurs 
assume to be proper.  TIGs  make possible that thi s estimation is already misaligned in 
reference to the true fundamental value. Clearly, the misalignment tends to be heavier, the less 
often  arbitrageurs  receive  fundamental  information,  i.e.,  the  longer  the  TIG.  One  may 
conclude that longer  TIGs should lead to a fall of market efficiency, at least in the strong 
form. Market efficiency in the semistrong form  might not be influenced by  TIGs, since the 
concept  merely  measures  the  difference  between  true  prices  and  arbitrageurs’  subjective 
fundamental perception while ignoring the objective misalignment of the latter. 
The results of our study run counter to these intuitions. Longer TIGs do not always mean a 
fall  of  market  efficiency.  The  explanation  lies  in  the  complex  effects  of  TIGs  on  price 
                                                 
2 One may wonder why we do not simply speak of information lags instead of temporal information gaps. The 
reason is that the term “information lag” suggests that all information is disclosed with the same delay. This does 
not apply to our model since we assume information of different periods to be released in a bundle.  
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volatility.  We  observe  that  under  certain  circumstances  longer  TIGs  tranquilize  market 
dynamics, which in turn improves efficiency. Thus, even if longer TIGs increase the bias 
between the true fundamental value and the perception of traders, market efficiency, in each 
form, improves if the volatility effect is strong enough. The analysis will show that the overall 
effect of larger TIGs on market efficiency depends on the endogenous stability of the market 
and on the interval in which the TIG is incremented.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section two is dedicated to a deeper theoretical foundation 
of our project. We recapitulate the state of efficiency research and conceptualize the process 
of  value  discovery.  Section  three  derives  the  relationships  between  TIGs  and  the  noise 
affecting the market. In section four we introduce the chartist-fundamentalist approach and 
develop  a  dynamic  behavioral  model  accordingly.  Section  five  presents  the  model 
simulations, resumes the complex results, and intends to provide interpretations. Section six 
underscores the relevance of the results in the context of corporate disclosure policy and 
institutional regulation. Finally, in section 7 we summarize the most important findings. 
2.  TEMPORAL INFORMAION GAPS AND NOISE 
This section is dedicated to TIGs, noise and the relationship between both. Economics refer to 
noise in many contexts and use the term with different connotations.
3 In the context of our 
study we define noise as an exogenously driven influence on the dynamics of prices. Shocks 
are understood as singular occurrences of noise.  
In  general, exogenous influences on the dynamics of prices arise from changes of the 
fundamental data. If fundamentals change, traders will compute a new fundamental value, 
reformulate their orders respectively, and prices will adjust to the new demand. Clearly, this 
                                                 
3 Black (1986) provides an overview of different fields and senses in which noise affects market efficiency.  
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mechanism  requires  that  traders  are  informed  about  the  occurrence  which  has  shifted 
fundamentals. As long as fundamental movements are not communicated to traders, they will 
not manipulate the dynamics of prices. During the TIG, therefore, no shocks will appear. This 
observation  enables  us  to  specify  the  initial  definition  of  shocks:  Shocks  consist  in  the 
recognition  of  fundamental  changes  from  one  observation  step  to  another.  Let  the 
parameter 𝑔?? denote the length of a TIG. It follows that a shock will arise every 𝑔???ℎ 
period. Formally:  
??ℎ??𝑘 = ? ∗ 𝑔??;   ? = 1,2,…?,   (1) 
where ??ℎ??𝑘 is any period in which a shock affects the dynamics of prices.  
What can be said about the relationship between gap and the average “size” of the shocks? If 
the true fundamental price follows a random walk, it will tend to drift apart from an initial 
value  over  time.  Accordingly,  as  long  as  traders  are  not  informed  about  fundamental 
movements, the deviance between their subjective pricing of the fundamental value and its 
true  level  tends  to  rise.  Thus,  when  traders  finally  learn  the  relevant  data,  the  perceived 
change of the fundamental value will on average be heavier, the longer the preceding TIG. 
We conclude that the shocks on price dynamics will be stronger, the higher the gap.  
The  exact  quantitative  relationship  is  easy  to  derive.  Assume  that  the  evolution  of  the 
fundamental value (?) is defined by 
??+1 = ?? + ??;    ??~𝗮(0,𝜎2),             (2) 
where ?? is the change of fundamentals in period t. ?? is a normally distributed, independent 
variable with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. For the normal distribution holds that if ? and ? are 
independent normal random variables with ?~𝗮(𝜇?,𝜎?
2) and ?~𝗮(𝜇?,𝜎?
2), then their sum 
? is normally distributed with ? = ? + ?~Ν(𝜇? + 𝜇?,𝜎?
2 + 𝜎?
2).    
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It follows that if ?1,?2,…,??are independent normal random variables with ?1~𝗮(0,𝜎2), 




This means that if traders learn the fundamental value every 𝑔???ℎ period, the variance of the 
perceived changes, and therefore the size of the shocks, will be 𝑔??-times the variance of the 
periodical change of fundamentals. Formally: 
𝜎?ℎ??𝑘
2 = 𝑔?? ∗ 𝜎2,  (3) 
where 𝜎?ℎ??𝑘
2 is the variance of shocks. Since the mean noise equals zero, the variance 𝜎2 is 
computed by 
 𝜎2 = ?[?2],  (4) 
where ?[?2] is the expected value of the squared fundamental changes. From (3) and (4) for 
we thus derive: 
𝜎?ℎ??𝑘
2 = 𝑔?? ∗ ?[?2],  (5) 




2],  with ??ℎ??𝑘 =  𝑔?? ∗ ?.  (6) 
From (6) results: 
𝜙??ℎ??𝑘 =  𝑔?? ∗ 𝜙?,    (7) 
where 𝜙??ℎ??𝑘 is the average absolute shock and 𝜙? the average absolute periodical change 
of  fundamentals.  Accordingly,  the  average  size  of  the  shock  after 𝑔?? periods  of  zero  
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fundamental news received by the traders will be  𝑔??-times the average periodical change 
of fundamentals. 
In summary, we could detect two effects of TIGs on noise: 
A.  The higher the TIG, the less often shocks hit the dynamics of prices. 
B.  The higher the TIG, the heavier the shocks will be. 
As exogenous shocks are generally known to destabilize dynamics, the two effects must be 
rivaling: When TIGs grow, the effect of fewer shocks (A) tends to stabilize the dynamics, 
whereas the effect of heavier shocks (B) works destabilizing.  
Which of the two effects prevails with respect to the average noise level? We define the 
average noise level as the mean shock averaged over all transaction periods, no matter if a 
shock appears or not. Formally:  
𝜙???𝑖?𝑒 = 𝜙??ℎ??𝑘 𝑔??   .  (8) 
Clearly,  if  traders  correctly  perceive  fundamentals  in  every  period,  all  fundamental 
movements will be transferred into reactions of demand and prices somehow. This is different 
if traders learn the true fundamentals every 𝑔???ℎ period, with 𝑔?? > 1. Probably, if 𝑔?? is 
high, not all fundamental changes in the span of 𝑔?? periods push fundamentals in the same 
direction. When traders finally learn the true fundamental value, movements will have offset 
each  other  to  some  degree.  The  sum  of  changes  which  are  actually  transferred  into 
formulations of demand and prices will be lower than the sum of changes in total. The extent 
to which fundamental occurrences compensate each other tends to rise, the less often the 
relevant information is available and fewer changes will be transferred into shocks. Therefore, 
the average noise level declines when incrementing the TIG. Note that the compensation- 
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effect is also the cause, why by (7) a higher TIG raises the mean size of the shocks only under 
proportionally.  
From (7) together with (8) the exact relationship between 𝑔?? and the average noise level can 
be deduced as: 
𝜙???𝑖?𝑒 =
1
 𝑔?? ∗ ∅?,  (9) 
Let us summarize our findings in a pragmatic form: 
Every quadruplication of the TIG will… 
–  …quarter the number of shocks in a finite span of time by (1). 
–  …double the mean size of the shock by (7). 
–  …halve the average noise level by (9). 
We conclude that the consequences of TIGs for price dynamics are ambiguous. TIGs lead to 
fewer shocks but enlarge them. The result that the average noise level is reduced suggests that 
TIGs might stabilize market dynamics. However, the further analysis will show that this idea 
is sometimes wrong. 
3.  THE MODEL 
3.1.  Motivation 
The notion of price adjustment and value discovery as complex processes call for a dynamic 
analysis. The psychological aspects of value discovery implicate a behavioral view. Drawn 
together  the  project  demands  a  dynamic  behavioral  approach.  The  chartist-fundamentalist 
approach (CFA) matches these needs. The CFA is a specification of the agent-based modeling 
approach, targeting the exploration of financial market dynamics.  
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Models with heterogeneous agents have proven to be quite successful in the past and have 
sharpened our understanding of the dynamics of real financial market. Agent-based modeling 
rests on the well supported evidence that individuals are boundedly rational (Simon 1955, 
Kahneman,  Slovic  and  Tversky  1986,  Smith  1991).  In  order  to  find  orientation  and  to 
compensate their lack of knowledge agents rely on heuristics, that is, behavioral rules. This is 
also true for agents in financial markets. A broad stock of empirical evidence agrees that 
investors apply either fundamental or technical trading rules (e.g. Taylor and Allen 1992, 
Menkhoff  1997,  Lui  and Mole 1998).  The CFA reproduces the  generic ideas of the two 
strategies:  Fundamentalists  trade  on  fundamental  information.  They  evaluate  economic, 
industrial, and corporate conditions in order to estimate the value of an asset as the present 
value  of  the  expected  future  dividends.  Fundamentalists  expect  prices  to  return  to  value 
sooner or later. Consequentially, they try to exploit mispricing. The strategy aims at long-run 
profits (Graham and Dodd 1951, Greenwald et al. 2001). In contrast, chartists trade with the 
trend.  They  regard  past  price  movements  as  an  indicator  of  the  market  sentiment. 
Consequentially,  chartists  extrapolate  price  trends.  The  strategy  aims  at  short  run  returns 
(Edwards and Magee 1966, Pring 1991, Murphy 1999). 
CFA-models displaying the interaction of both agent groups can create complex nonlinear 
dynamics. Some of these models replicate the stylized facts of real financial markets quite 
adequately. Among those facts are: bubbles and crashes, excessive volatility (variations of 
price  that  cannot  be  justified  by  fundamental  news),  non-normal  distributed  returns,  and 
volatility clustering (alternation of periods of low and high volatility).
4 
With reference to the market dynamics each group of investors plays a different role. The 
effect of fundamentalism is comparable with arbitrage. The strategy leads to a reduction of the 
                                                 
4 For a deeper study of stylized facts see Mantenga and Stanley (2000), Cont (2001), Lux and Ausloos (2002), 
Johnson, Jefferies and Hui (2003) or Sornette (2003).  
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mispricing adding a negative feedback to the dynamics. The extrapolation of price trends by 
chartist brings a positive feedback and produces market inefficiency.  
The  model-driven  CFA  affords  several  methodical  advantages.  The  method  enables  to 
precisely gauge all variables, control for exogenous shocks and generate as much data as 
needed.  
3.2.  Setup 
The model we use here may be regarded as a extension of the model developed in Westerhoff 
(2003a). The Setup can be summarized as follows: We look at a stylized speculative market 
of financial securities. Traders can switch between technical and fundamental strategy. For 
every  period  the  fraction  of  traders  relying  on  each  trading  rule  depends  on  the  current 
distortion of the market. Every 𝑔?? periods agents update their cognition of the fundamental 
value. After having chosen a strategy agents formulate their orders accordingly. The resulting 
excess demand generates the price of the next period at last. 
In our model we differentiate two conceptualizations of the fundamental value: the objective 
and the subjective one. The objective fundamental value refers to the price omniscient and 
perfectly  rational  agents  would  compute  as  the  proper  security  price.  In  this  sense  the 
objective fundamental value equals the true fundamental value. We assume insiders to have 
such  a  view.  Contrarily,  the  subjective  fundamental  value  corresponds  to  the  imperfect 
perception of traders who are affected by temporal information gaps. 
In order to model the objective fundamental value we keep up the general assumption for the 
evolution of fundamentals made in (2). Let ?? denote the objective fundamental value, then: 
??+1
? = ??
? + ??;  ??~𝗮(0,𝜎2),  (10)  
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??  still  denotes  the  change  of  fundamentals  in  period  t,  since  every  new  fundamental 
occurrence  will  instantly  effectuate  an  adequate  adjustment  of  the  objective  fundamental 
value.  
In order to model the subjective fundamental value we assume that ordinary traders correctly 
compute the true fundamental value once they learn all relevant information. Contrarily, when 
no  news  reaches  investors,  they  will  base  their  calculations  on  the  most  recent  data. 
Remember that traders receive fundamentals every gap periods. We formalize:  
??+1
? =  
??+1
0 , ? + 1 ∈  𝑔??,2𝑔??,…,?𝑔?? 
??
?, ??ℎ𝑒?𝑤𝑖?𝑒
   (11) 
Equation (11) states that the subjective fundamental value equals the objective fundamental 
value every 𝑔???ℎ period, as to all these steps traders catch up their information deficit. In all 
other periods the subjective fundamental value of tomorrow remains the same as today, since 
traders reckon up the same old numbers.  
Let us turn to the inner working of the market. The price adjustment process is given by a so-
called price impact function (Farmer and Joshi 2002). A price impact function relates today’s 
excess demand for an asset to the change of the price from today to tomorrow. The excess 
demand equals the sum of the individual demands of chartists and fundamentalists weighted 
with their relative fraction in the market. Accordingly, the security price S in period t+1 is 
given by 
??+1 = ?? + ?? ????
? +  1 − ?? ??
? ,  (12) 
where ??
? and ??
? stand for the demand of chartists and fundamentalist respectively, and ?? 
denotes  the  relative  fraction  of  chartists. ??  is  a  positive  price  adjustment  coefficient. 
According to (12), excess buying drives prices up, whereas excess selling drives prices down.  
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The higher ??, the stronger the reaction of prices will be. The equation is a simplification of 
the actual order matching mechanism. It may be interpreted as a stylized description of the 
behavior of risk-neutral market makers who adjust prices with respect to excess demand. 
The demand of chartist can be written as 
??
? = ?? ?? − ??−1 ,  (13) 
with the positive parameter ?? regulating the aggressiveness of chartists. Chartists bet on the 
latest price trend to go on. Hence, they receive a buying (selling) signal if the current price 
exceeds (undercuts) the price level one period before. 
The orders generated by the fundamental strategy can be expressed as 
??
? = ?? ??
? − ?? ,  (14) 
where ?? calibrates the strategy’s aggressiveness. Fundamentalists believe that prices tend to 
revert to the fundamental value. Therefore, they get a buying (selling) signal, if prices are 
above (below) the fundamental value. Since traders do not always know the true fundamental 
value, the subjective fundamental value is relevant here. 





2  (15) 
The  equation  represents  the  switching  mechanism  of  traders  between  technical  and 
fundamental  strategies.  The  more  prices  deviate  from  value,  the  more  traders  adhere  to 
fundamental  analysis.  The  arguments  of  Black  (1986)  and  Hommes  (2001)  support  the 
intuition. According to Black trading on information (i.e. fundamentalism) instead of noise 
(i.e. chartism) promises more profits to exploit, the higher the distortion of prices. Hommes 
argues that if prices deviate strongly from the fundamental value a consolidation is probable.  
- 14 - 
 
Fundamental  trading  rules  prescribing  to  trade  against  the  bubble  become  attractive.  In 
contrast, technical strategies which rely on the bubble’s growing inflation become risky. ?1 
and ?2 (15) are positive parameters regulating the quantitative dimension of the bell-shaped 
function.  The  higher  ?1 ,  the  greater  the  proportion  of  traders  who  never  desist  from 
fundamental trading. The higher ?2 the faster traders switch to fundamentalism when prices 
disconnect  from  fundamentals.  Again,  the  perceived  subjective  fundamental  value  is 
important here. 
3.3.  Calibration 
Taylor and Allen (1992) report that 5 to 10 percent of traders always stick to fundamental 
analysis. ?1 = 0.1 is consistent with this finding. ?2is set to 100. We choose ?? = 1 and ?? = 
2.  The  reaction-coefficient  left  to  configure  is ??.  Westerhoff  (2003b)  indicates  that  the 
interaction of traders might reproduce some of the stylized facts of financial markets purely 
endogenously. Accordingly, we choose ?? such that the model yields complex dynamics even 
with  constant  fundamentals  (𝜎 = 0).  This  applies  for ?? in  the  range  of  2  to  8.  In  the 
following  simulations  we  will  vary ?? within  these  restrictions  in  order  to  carry  out  the 
analysis under different market conditions. Depending on the simulation run we will set 𝜎 to 0 
or 0.2. 
4.  SIMULATIONS 
4.1 Capturing Efficiency  
The  model  we  have  built  allows  testing  for  all  three  forms  of  market  efficiency.  We 
concentrate on the semistrong and the strong form. We measure market efficiency in terms of 
volatility and distortion. We define volatility as the average of absolute returns, that is:  




?    ?? − ??−1  ?
?=1   (16) 
Relative to volatility, distortion captures market efficiency more directly. We define distortion 
as the average absolute deviation of prices from its fundamental value. Since our analysis 
distinguishes objective and subjective fundamentals we come to two versions of distortion. 
The first version is: 
Ø?? =
1
?    ?? − ??
?  ?
?=1   (17) 
The formalization gives the average absolute deviation of prices from objective fundamentals. 
As the objective fundamental value represents the insider view, the equation directly yields a 
measure of market efficiency in the strong from. The second version is: 
Ø?? =
1
?    ?? − ??
?  ?
?=1   (18) 
The  formalization  gives  the  average  absolute  deviation  of  prices  from  subjective 
fundamentals. Since the subjective value accounts for the information publicly available, the 
equation directly yields a measure of efficiency in the semistrong form. 
4.2 Some numerical results 
The tools just developed enable us to evaluate the simulation runs presented in this section. 
For  every  run  a  legend  on  the  right  displays  the  measures  of  volatility  (∅?)  as  well  as 
subjective (∅??) and objective distortion (∅??).  
We first want to get a feeling for the endogenous dynamics of the model. By setting 𝜏 to zero 
?? remains  constant  to  100  over  time.  Accordingly,  no  noise  will  disturb  the  dynamics. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of prices for two different values of ??. In the first run ??  
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equals 2, in the second ?? has been altered to 8. Remember that ?? represents the reaction 
intensity of chartists.  
-------- Figure 2 -------- 
Watch the upper simulation run first. The dynamic of prices follows a rather complex walk 
neither  reaching  an  equilibrium  state  nor  a  regular  attractor.  Considering  the  absence  of 
fundamental  news  the  volatility  of  0.44  must  be  completely  excessive.  Furthermore,  the 
dynamics switches between intervals of calm (e.g. from t = 225 to t = 275) and turbulent (e.g. 
from t = 80 to t = 160) motion. This phenomenon is known as on-off intermittency. On-off 
intermittency is a form of volatility clustering which is produced completely endogenously. 
For the objective fundamental value being constant over time there is no TIG in the cognition 
of traders. The subjective and the objective fundamental value coincide. As a result, objective 
and subjective distortion are equal (∅?? = ∅?? = 0.27). In general, our model replicates some 
of the stylized facts of real financial markets.  
Now contemplate the run below. Remember that the chartist strategy is calibrated to be more 
aggressive. We observe that the volatility of the dynamics has risen remarkably. This is true 
for  intervals  of  low  and  high  volatility.  Furthermore,  on-off  intermittency  has  become 
distinctive. From time to time and without apparent reason the dynamic jumps into a phase of 
extreme  fluctuations.  In  the  following  the  oscillations  decline  gradually  and  finally  settle 
down to the normal level. Overall, the average volatility has climbed to 3.67. Moreover, the 
higher volatility has caused an increase in distortion. Subjective and objective distortions have 
reached at 1.87. In general, the higher intensity of chartism has deteriorated market efficiency 
considerably. The observation holds for efficiency in its strong and in its semistrong form.  
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For the following analyses we set 𝜎 to 0.2. The objective fundamental value now moves in 
every transaction period. This is a necessary condition for the study of TIGs. For TIGs greater 
than one period ordinary traders will have an information deficit relative to insiders. 
Figure 3 resumes the results for ?? = 2. The length of the TIG has been varied. The first three 
panels show exemplary simulation runs for different gaps. For every run the curve of prices 
together with the curve of objective fundamentals are drawn. The two panels on the bottom 
aggregate the results of several simulations. 
-------- Figure 3 -------- 
In the first simulation run gap equals one period. Accordingly there is no TIG. The subjective 
value  equals  the  objective  one.  Objective  and  subjective  distortion  correspond.  For  the 
fundamentals now follow a random walk, the level of prices changes over time.
5 Moreover, 
intervals in which prices strongly fluctuate around the subjective value (e.g. from t = 170 to t 
= 230) alternate with periods in which prices follow value rather accurately (e.g. from t = 230 
to t = 330). Relative to the respective simulation run with no noise (Figure 1, first pa nel) 
volatility and distortions have risen significantly.  
What part of the volatility can be attributed to shifts of fundamentals? In our model 𝜎 = 0.2 is 
equivalent to an average periodical change of the objective value of about 0.16. With 1.39 the 
measured price volatility is excessively higher. We conclude that the vast majority of price 
volatility points to true market inefficiency. The measures of distortion confirm the fall of 
efficiency. Objective and subjective distortion have climbed to 0.72. Evidently, efficiency has 
deteriorated due to the presence of noise.  
In  the  second  simulation  run  gap  has  been  increased  to  twenty  periods.  Recall  that,  the 
demand of traders is based on subjective fundamentals, However, the longer the TIGs, the 
more the objective value, following a random walk, tends to drift apart from the subjective 
                                                 
5 We cannot see the curve of objective fundamentals because it is covered by the evolution of prices.  
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one.  Hence,  trading  is  geared  to  a  level  which  continuously  less  corresponds  to  the  true 
fundamental value. As a result, we expect objective distortion to rise. 
Indeed, prices start to disconnect from objective fundamentals. Furthermore, we observe that 
when traders get to know the latest information, their subsequent reaction sometimes entails 
phases in which volatility is relatively high (e.g. at t = 180). Overall, the average volatility has 
dropped to 0.87. As a result, the subjective distortion has also declined to 0.49. Moreover, the 
objective distortion has remained constant to 0.72. This observation strongly contradicts our 
intuition  just  established. The solution  is that  we have ignored the effect  of volatility on 
distortion. Even if prices fluctuate around a less adequate value, due to lower oscillations the 
objective distortion has not risen. 
In the third run gap has been increased another time to 160. The disconnection of prices from 
objective fundamentals has become unmistakable and more durable than before. When traders 
now get the latest information, their reaction can be drastic. The consequent trading on the 
news pushes the dynamics into quite long lasting phases in which volatility is pronounced. 
Apparently, news is not instantly transformed into a new level of prices but initiate a complex 
adjustment  process.  Within  the  phase  of  adjustment  trading  volume  is  high  since  agents 
interact  intensively. Fundamentalists directly  react  to  the  fundamental  news and induce a 
price trend towards the new fundamental value. Unfortunately, chartists trade on this trend 
and provoke an overshoot. When the misalignment is too heavy, chartism withdraws and 
fundamentalism takes control again. The mechanism repeats until prices have settled down to 
their normal attractor. However, the true fundamental value has considerably shifted in the 
meantime. The dynamics is swinging into a level that does not represent the true fundamental 
value anymore. Obviously, the adjustment process is too slow to guarantee market efficiency, 
neither in the strong, nor in the semistrong form. On the contrary, arbitrage itself has yield 
inefficiency by stimulating intense trading volumes and excessive volatility. The efficiency  
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measures reflect the observations. As a result of the turbulent phases, the overall volatility has 
escalated to 1.55. Because of the higher volatility the subjective distortion has increased to 
0.81. Due to the rise of volatility and due to the higher divergence between subjective and 
objective fundamentals the objective distortion has climbed to 2.02.  
The two panels at the bottom confirm the results for a large number of observations. Watch 
the  left  bottom  panel  first.  The  panel  shows  the  relationship  between  different  TIGs  and 
volatility. We measured volatility for gaps of 1, 10, 20, 40, 80, and 160 periods. For every gap 
we performed 20 runs of 5000 periods and computed the average volatility. The high number 
of  observations  should  guarantee  that  the  results  are  not  disturbed  by  chance.  The  curve 
reveals  a  decline  of  volatility  at  the  beginning.  However,  for  gaps  greater  than  20  the 
volatility increases continuously.  
The  panel  on  the  right  captures  the  respective  measures  of  objective  (dashed  curve)  and 
subjective distortion. For small gaps both curves fall indicating lower distortion. For higher 
gaps  the  graphs  slope  upwards;  objective  and  subjective  distortion  rise.  Note  that  the 
subjective distortion is solely affected by price volatility. Thus, both curves are alike. Apart 
from volatility, the rising inadequacy of subjective value consequent to higher TIGs shapes 
the curve of objective distortion. As a result, for every gap the objective distortion lies above 
the subjective one. 
We now turn to the case of aggressive chartists setting ?? to 8. Figure 4 illustrates the results. 
The organization of the panels and the underlying methods of computation are the same as 
before. Since the dynamics of prices would cover the curve of fundamentals completely, we 
let the latter apart. 
-------- Figure 4 --------  
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Let us inspect the topmost simulation run first. Relative to the runs before the measures of 
volatilities and, therefore, distortions have exploded. Additionally, the effects of higher TIGs 
have changed. Altering the gap from 1 to 40 has boosted volatility and distortions. Obviously, 
this is because the dynamics tends jump into phases of exceeding volatility when traders 
receive the latest fundamentals after a while of no news at all. However, when we increase the 
gap further to 160, volatility and distortions decline. The cause is that the number of phases of 
immense volatility has dropped.  
The panels on the bottom mirror the observations. For small gaps volatility and distortions 
grow, whereas for larger gaps they shrink.
6 Since for all gaps volatility is high in comparison 
to the change of fundamentals, the volatility effect on objective distortion is highly dominant. 
As a consequence the curves of subjective and objective are both shaped by volatility leading 
to similar evolutions of all three graphs.  
In comparison with the case of ?? = 2 the curves of volatility and distortions have reverted. 
Apparently,  the  endogenous  stability  of  the  market,  determined  by  the  aggressiveness  of 
chartists, dictates the relationship between TIGs and market efficiency. 
Figure 5 merges the results. We have measured volatility, subjective, and objective distortion 
for different combination of TIGs and parameter ??. The panels reveal smooth transitions 
from the level curves for a ?? = 2 (front side) to the level curves of ?? = 8 (back side). The 
regularity of the relationships can be confirmed.  
-------- Figure 5 -------- 
                                                 
6 Clearly, with respect to objective distortion this cannot be the end of the story. If traders would not achieve any 
information  about  the  true  fundamentals  (i.e.  the  gap  tends  infinity),  prices  would  not  follow  objective 
fundamentals at all; objective distortion is maximal.  
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4.3 Interpretation  
What are the reasons for the different relationships between market efficiency and the length 
of the TIG? The answer lies in the effects of TIGs on the noise impacting the dynamics. As 
demonstrated in section 2, longer gaps lead to fewer shocks (A), but heavier shocks (B). The 
positive consequences of effect A are rather linear; the less often shocks disturb the dynamic, 
the more often the dynamics follows its natural run. In contrast, the negative consequences of 
effect B depend on the endogenous characteristics of the market.  
If the market is endogenously quite stable (?? = 2), it can compensate a certain size of shocks 
relatively  well.  As  a  result,  for  small  gaps  the  positive  effect  A  dominates  effect  B;  the 
average  volatility  declines.  However,  from  a  certain  gap  length  on  the  market  cannot 
withstand the shocks anymore and phases of strong volatility appear. Effect  B dominates 
effect A; the average volatility rises. 
In the instable configuration (??  = 8) the market is very sensitive to noise because chartists 
aggressively  extrapolate  the  adjustment  reaction  of  fundamentalists  subsequent  to  news. 
Hence, even small shocks can trigger phases of huge volatility. As a result, the negative 
consequences  of  effect  B  are  remarkable  from  short  gaps  on;  average  volatility  rises. 
Nonetheless,  incrementing  the  gap  beyond  a  certain  level  does  not  produce  additional 
volatility. The cause is that once the shocks are continuously heavy enough to initiate high 
volatility phases, effect A starts to prevail: shocks become fewer and, thus, fewer phases of 
high volatility show up; the overall volatility declines. 
Market efficiency in the semistrong form, that is, subjective distortion results directly from 
market  volatility.  Hence,  longer  gaps  can  deteriorate  or  improve  semistrong  market 
efficiency.  Market  efficiency  in  the  strong  form,  that  is,  objective  distortion  results  from 
volatility  and  from  the  bias  between  subjective  and  objective  value.  The  bias  between 
perceived  and  true  value  tends  to  rise  with  larger  gaps.  Accordingly,  we  expect  strong  
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efficiency to fall. However, if longer gaps simultaneously stabilize the dynamics, the change 
in volatility sometimes offsets the intuitive relation. We observe this phenomenon especially 
when  the  market  is  endogenously  highly  unstable  (?? =  8).  Hence,  under  certain 
circumstances longer TIGs improve market efficiency, even in the strong form. 
We conclude that the impact of temporal information gaps on market efficiency is ambiguous. 
Both, strong and semistrong efficiency can rise or fall with larger TIGs. The exact result 
depends, first, on the endogenous characteristics of the market and, second, on the interval in 
which we increment the gap.  
The observations may be interesting but still do not satisfy. Are the effects of temporary 
information gaps on market efficiency indeed so intricate? In our model the complexity of the 
findings is due to the ability of the model to produce turbulent phases in response to shocks of 
a  certain  size.  The  occurrence  of  phases  of  abnormal  volatility  consequent  to  singular 
exogenous shocks is denoted as transient behavior. Is transient behavior a property of real 
financial  markets?  Indeed,  there  is  much  empirical  evidence  which  documents  that  the 
variability of stock returns after annual and interim earnings announcements is abnormal high 
(e.g. Beaver 1968, May 1971). Transient behavior can be found in reality.  
5.  RELEVANCE 
We  suppose  the  results  to  offer  some  new  insights  for  theory  and  practice.  Up  to  now, 
research seems to believe that a reduction of the information asymmetry between ordinary 
traders and firms, without a doubt, would improve market efficiency (e.g. Lev 1992). Our 
dynamic analysis could prove that this relation does not hold necessarily.   
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In practice private as well as public institutions could benefit from these results. First, the 
findings are relevant for corporate information disclosure strategy
7. Several studies report that 
firms disseminate good news more often than bad news (e.g. Pastena and Ronen 1979, Kross 
and  Schroeder 1984,  Dye  and  Sridhar 1995).  In  general,  firms  have  been  observed  to 
voluntarily  disclose  value -relevant  information  quite  rarely.  We  assume  that  firms  are 
interested in keeping the volatility of its stock prices low in order to achieve high calculability 
and suggest stability to the public. If so, holding back information may be risky. Suppose that 
with the next regular report the withheld information come out all together. Then, the batch of 
news reaching traders could push the dynamics of prices in a phase of high volatility.  
Second, disclosure regulation setters may regard the results with respect to market distortion 
as  a  direct  indicator  of  market  efficiency.  The  common  belief  is  that  strict  disclosure 
requirements warrant liquid and efficient markets and reduce the cost of capital for firms. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) prove that a tightening of disclosure regulations can be welfare 
beneficial. However, it may be difficult to identify the precise regulation to exploit the 
positive potential. Moreover, there are cases in which stronger regulation is harmful since 
corporate costs of disclosure exceed the public benefit. Our analysis confirms and amplifies 
the  findings.  “Forcing  firms  to  talk”  more  often  may  be  efficiency-,  and  thus,  welfare-
improving, yet sometimes welfare shrinks. The conclusion holds beyond disclosure costs. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Our  study  has  demonstrated  that  the  effects  of  temporal  information  gaps  on  market 
efficiency are far from straightforward. While we supposed longer temporal information gaps 
to deteriorate market efficiency, the analysis has shown that the relationship may sometimes 
be the other way around. The simulations have demonstrated this for market efficiency in the 
                                                 
7 For a survey of corporate disclosure strategy see Lev (1992).  
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semistrong  and  in  the  strong  form.  The  surprising  results  could  be  explained  by  the 
relationships  between  temporal  information  gaps  and  the  noise  affecting  the  dynamics. 
Extensive gaps lead to fewer but heavier shocks. Overall the average noise level declines. The 
changes in noise influence market volatility. Subjective market distortion (semistrong market 
efficiency) directly results from volatility. The relationship between information gaps and 
objective market distortion (strong market efficiency) is determined by volatility and by the 
discrepancy between subjective perception and true fundamental value. If average volatility 
declines consequent to an extension of the temporal information gap, the negative effect of 
the increased perception bias is sometimes offset. As a result, market efficiency, even in its 
strong form, may improve when the temporal information gap is prolonged. The abnormal 
finding is especially likely, if retaining news tranquilizes market volatility relatively well. 
In general, our study supports the notion of price adjustment and value discovery as complex 
processes. While the configuration of value discovery represented the depended variable, the 
complexity of the adjustment process turned out to arise endogenously by the presence of 
different trading strategies. We could observe that arbitrage implicates the intense interaction 
of traders over a certain span of time. During the phase of adjustment the market can be 
highly  volatile.  In  this  sense  the  mechanism  of  arbitrage  itself  may  temporarily  trigger, 
instead of removing, inefficiency.  
We believe that there is still need for investigation on the topic. While our model driven 
approach contributed to uncover the complex aspects of the relationship between temporal 
information  gaps  and  market  efficiency,  future  research  should  identify  how  likely  the 
different scenarios might be for reality. We hope our study will motivate successive projects 
in this area. 
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Figure 2: The panels show the dynamics of prices for different values of ??, the reaction parameter of chartists. In the first 
panel ?? =  2,  in  the  second ?? =  8.  Volatility  (ØV)  and  distortions  (Ø??,  Ø??)  of  the  respective  simulation  run  are 
appended on the right. No noise was added. 
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Figure 1: Discovery of fundamental value as a complex process 
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Figure 3: The first three panels show the evolution of objective fundamentals (thin line) and the dynamics of prices for 
different information-gaps. In the first panel the dynamics of prices covers the evolution of fundamentals visually. The 
measure of volatility (ØV), subjective distortion (∅Ds), and objective distortion (∅Do) for the respective simulation run are 
appended on the right. The random walk of objective fundamentals is the same for all three simulations. The left panel below 
illustrates volatility, the right panel subjective and objective distortion (dashed line), depending on the gap. Volatility and 
distortions were measured for gaps of 1, 10, 20, 40, 80 and 160; results are based on twenty simulation runs of 5000 periods 
each for every gap. Parameter ?? = 2. For other parameters see section “calibration”.   
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Figure 4: Same as in figure 3, except simulation run panels display prices only. Now parameter ?? = 8. For other parameters 
see section “calibration”. 
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Figure 5: Volatility (left) and subjective distortion (middle) and objective distortion (right) for different combinations of gap 
and parameter ??. ?? was set to 2, 4, 6, and 8. Chosen gap lengths were 1, 10, 20, 40, 80 and 160. Average volatility and 
distortions of every combination are based on twenty simulation runs of 5000 periods. BERG Working Paper Series on Government and Growth 
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